This paper assesses whether the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) signals China's reformist intention in the area of international development. I use both descriptive and inferential statistics to compare power distribution in the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the AIIB, and the composition of the AIIB membership. Evidence shows that there is no obvious structural difference in voting power among the three banks. The major difference between them is that China is the most powerful state in the AIIB. For the time being at least, the AIIB does not signal Beijing's intention to reform the current system. Instead the bank seems to be an instrument that China can use to compete with established international financial institutions. However, Beijing may be faced with several challenges.
Global economic imbalance leads to change in the global distribution of economic resources. While some foresee the inevitable decline of U.S. power, others consider China’s forthcoming global primacy to be an exaggeration. This paper seeks to contribute to the debate by linking balance of payments (BOP) to power analysis. Dimensions of BOP are connected to Keohane and Nye’s two ideal-types of interdependence relationship: realist and complex interdependence.
Attracting allies through cultural exchange and economic interdependence, what Nye refers to as "soft power," is becoming increasingly important for states around the world. This thinking is increasingly influencing not only East Asian governments, but also their citizens.
This paper proposes that if a political system is more like to facilitate a unified government, to establish a strong executive body and to respond to the needs of the majority, financial reforms are more likely to emerge from the policymaking process and produce positive results. On the contrary, political systems that discourage those governing features are less likely to produce reforms. This chapter compares financial reform processes in China, Taiwan and New Zealand. All of them performed low level of financial reforms in the early 1980s but resulted in different situations later.
In the face of a rising China, some scholars have argued that ASEAN countries will choose to either bandwagon with or balance against China, while others believe they will respond with a more moderate policy known as “hedging.” In considering these options, ASEAN countries must take into account their individual interests within the economic and security structure of this region.
Although the rise of an economically powerful China benefits many developing countries, many worry about China’s surging regional and global influences, especially in Southeast Asia. It is true that China rises fast but how successfully does it translate its rising power into actual influences remains a question. In this study I answer the questions by examining a crucial case of Sino-Myanmar relationship. Because Myanmar relies heavily on China, it should be more easily to be influenced by China.
Whether a positive relationship exists between foreign aid and economic development is debatable. Supporters of foreign aid argue that aid money can translate into economic growth, while skeptics suggest that aid cannot lead to prosperity due to poor management of aid funds.