When we talk about the terms “ASEAN” or “ASEAN countries”, it is actually implied that the ten members of ASEAN should be treated as a group that share similar foreign policy, or even a common one. Studying Southeast Asian countries' foreign policies, however, we consider such approach as partial and narrow. A salient example goes to divergent responses toward ASEAN-China free trade agreement implemented on January 1, 2010. Although several countries welcomed opening trade relationship with China, Indonesia and Malaysia voiced their concerns and disturbances. In addition, Southeast Asian countries perceive U.S. military presence in the region in a very different way. While Vietnam seeks to balance a rising China with U.S., Myanmar bandwagons with Beijing in seeking protection. Observing Southeast Asian countries' divergent external behaviors pushes me to construct a theoretical framework that disaggregates a myth of ASEAN as being a coherent body.
I co-work with Alan Yang, research fellow at the Institute of International Relations of National Chengchi University, on this idea. Our thought is embodied in a research paper presented at the annual convention of International Studies Association 2011 held at downtown Montreal of Canada. The paper is titled “A Harmonized Southeast Asia? Explanatory Typologies of Southeast Asian Countries' Strategies to the Rise of China.” We develop our theory by examining Southeast Asian countries' divergent responses to the rise of China.
We challenge four traditional explications on this topic and propose an alternative approach to explain the divergence. We argue that each country's foreign policy toward China depends on its distinct economic and security conditions embedded in this region; therefore each would confront different security and economic relations with China. Each countries' response can be characterized into four situations, which are conditioned by the combination of categorized in terms of high or low degree of threat perception (HT or LT) from China, as well as positive or negative economic expectation (PE or NE) with China. We thus hypothesize ASEAN countries in the HT-NE situation would soft-balance against China; those in the LT-PE situation would bandwagon with China; those in the HT-PE or LT-NE situations would hedge against China (see figure 1). In this initial project, we use qualitative data to test our hypotheses. The case of Vietnam-China fits well in a sense that Vietnam's soft-balancing against China derives from high threat perception coming from China and expecting economic loss after cooperate deeper with China. On the contrary, the case of Cambodia-China exemplifies the other extreme on the spectrum in a sense that Phnom Penh's bandwagoning with China derives from low threat perception and expected economic gains.
Figure 1. Spectrum of Southeast Asian States' Strategies
In our panel, we receive valuable comments from participants, especially from Professor Yasumasa Komori affiliated with Michigan State University. He rightly pointed out that examining cases locating at the extremes, soft-balancing and bandwagoning, are easy. What's more challenging is explaining hedging behaviors. Are there any difference between countries confronting HT-PE and LT-NE. With this concern in mind, we plan to extend our theoretical scope that would include hedging behaviors with many kinds, instead of just one type called “hedging”. While some countries resort to equidistant relationship with regional great powers as its hedging strategy of diversifying risks, others rely on the formation of a coalition in which secondary states participate or focus on strengthening one's own capability. What factors differentiate hedging strategies could be an interesting and underdeveloped topic for us to study. In addition, finding ways to appropriately operationalize, or quantify, conditions and behaviors for our research would be another emphasis of this research project. We hope our efforts on developing operationalized dataset can contribute to the international relations literatures by providing replicable information for scholars to replicate and improve in the future.