Ian Tsung-yen Chen 陳宗巖

This study investigates how Taiwan's government gained support for lifting the ban on US pork imports despite widespread health-risk opposition. We ask whether strategic framing can elevate collective national interests over individual concerns in a precarious geopolitical context. Using a vignette experiment that randomly assigns respondents to national-benefit versus personal-interest frames, we find that emphasizing Taiwan's international space significantly increases support for trade liberalization, whereas appeals to health risks and losses for pig farmers do not yield statistically significant effects. The results suggest that linking unpopular economic reforms to concrete diplomatic gains can suppress personal-welfare concerns in threatened democracies.

This article examines how South Korea is seeking to reshape its technological competitiveness amid U.S.-China rivalry and the restructuring of global supply chains. South Korea built its global strength in memory semiconductors and advanced manufacturing through a developmental-state model, chaebol-led industrial organization, and a “fast follower” strategy. However, its heavy dependence on the Chinese market, concentration in a limited number of technological sectors, talent outflows, and weaknesses in original innovation have created growing strategic vulnerabilities. U.S. export controls, Taiwan's advantages in advanced semiconductor manufacturing, China's rapid technological catch-up, and the rising capital and computing requirements of AI have intensified these pressures. In response, South Korea is promoting its K-Semiconductor Strategy, semiconductor clusters, AI infrastructure, domestic AI chips, and high-bandwidth memory. South Korea's future position as a technology power will depend on reforming its talent and innovation systems, shifting from technological catch-up to original leadership, and securing a more resilient position within international technology and supply-chain networks.

This study examines the relationship between nationalism and inward foreign direct investment (FDI) by introducing a political survival framework. This article suggests that the impact of nationalism on FDI is not uniform but is strategically mediated by the domestic political interests of national leaders. Specifically, economic nationalism is more likely to be enforced when it serves as a convenient tool for leaders to consolidate their winning coalitions and ensure political survival; conversely, when the target of nationalist sentiment provides essential resources necessary for maintaining power, leaders may rationally ignore or mitigate nationalist demands. Through a qualitative analysis of anti-colonial, anti-Chinese and anti-Western sentiments in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, the research demonstrates that the enforcement of economic nationalism can elevate political risks for multinational corporations, leading to a decline in FDI. The divergence in state responses across these cases illustrates how different political structures and resource dependencies shape varied economic outcomes. These findings contribute to the literature on international political economy by highlighting how the logic of political survival informs the economic consequences of nationalism in Southeast Asia.

This article argues that artificial intelligence is redefining the foundations of national power. In the past, national strength was largely measured by territory, industrial capacity, energy resources, and military equipment; today, it is increasingly determined by computing power, advanced chips, data, and algorithmic capabilities. In terms of hard power, AI can accelerate intelligence analysis, target identification, and autonomous weapons decision-making, shifting military competition from firepower toward decision speed and system integration. Economically, semiconductor design, manufacturing equipment, GPUs, energy, and capital have become critical strategic bottlenecks, while U.S.-China export controls and supply-chain restructuring are creating new strategic dilemmas for Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union. In the realm of soft power, countries are competing to shape global rules through AI governance frameworks, platform algorithms, and technological narratives. The author emphasizes that success in the AI era will depend not only on who possesses the most computing power, but also on who can build the institutions, talent, and governance capacity needed to convert technological advantages into lasting national strength while preserving meaningful human control over critical decisions.

Taiwan occupies a pivotal position in the economic dimension of great power rivalry between the United States and China. Its importance lies in sustaining the movement of goods, energy, and technology that keep global supply chains running and shape the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. This study argues that Taiwan's economic stability is essential for maintaining access to critical networks that support the relative capabilities of the United States and its allies. Using trade data and policy analysis, it examines three key sectors, namely food, energy, and semiconductors, to show how disruptions around Taiwan could trigger wider global economic instability. It also explores how Taiwan has become an active participant in US-led initiatives to strengthen supply chain resilience and technological cooperation. The findings reveal that Taiwan's role in global economic systems is both practical and strategic. Its stability underpins not only regional prosperity but also the ability of democratic partners to respond to China's expanding influence. By linking material interdependence with strategic behaviour, this study contributes to understanding how economic networks shape great power rivalry in the twenty-first century.

This study compares the rise and fall of two Philippine presidents, Joseph Estrada and Rodrigo Duterte, to understand how populist leaders in the Philippines utilize political narratives to mobilize supporters and how interactions with critical strategic groups affect regime stability. The study posits that external political and economic conditions, along with the past successes of populist leaders, are crucial factors shaping the content and strength of political narratives. Once these narratives are formed, populist leaders must collaborate with critical strategic groups to transform them into policy; successful policies reinforce this collaboration, while failure may lead to the leader's downfall. Evidence from the two comparative case studies reveals that Estrada rose with a "Robin Hood-style" populism, emphasizing solidarity with the poor, anti-corruption, and social justice, but was eventually forced to step down due to strained relations with the Catholic Church and the military. In contrast, Duterte's "penal populism" focused on harshly crackdowns on crime and drugs, successfully leveraging cooperation with the police and military to consolidate power. These findings highlight the importance of critical strategic groups in Philippine politics and illustrate the similarities and differences in how populism manifests under different leaders.

The Taiwan Strait has become a central flashpoints in contemporary great-power competition. This study examines the drivers of China's escalating military incursions near Taiwan by analyzing the interaction of system-level structural shifts and unit-level domestic forces. At the system level, China's assertiveness reflects its narrowing power gap with the United States and its efforts to contest U.S. influence, particularly during triggering events such as Pelosi's 2022 Taiwan visit and Lai Ching-te's 2024 presidential inauguration. At the unit level, the centralization of decision-making under Xi Jinping, rising nationalism, and economic pressures create incentives for risk-seeking behavior, reinforcing coercive policies toward Taiwan. The findings indicate that China's military harassment fluctuates with both structural competition and domestic pressures, intensifying during politically sensitive moments and entrenching gray-zone tactics as a routine feature of its strategy. Although these dynamics have not yet converged into a critical war window, the accumulation of coercive measures and recurring crises has kept the risk of great-power war elevated and the trajectory of cross-Strait relations increasingly uncertain.

Gerald Chan's China's Health Silk Road: Vaccine Diplomacy and Health Governance presents a comprehensive analysis of China's growing influence in global health governance. The book's eight chapters investigate the multifaceted interplay between China's domestic health advancements, its international health diplomacy, and the broader global governance landscape. At the heart of this analysis is the concept of geo-developmentalism—a framework that emphasizes mutual infrastructure-driven economic growth by fostering connections across the globe. This serves as a pivotal lens throughout the book. Geo-developmentalism underscores China's strategic integration of public health with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), revealing how health diplomacy operates as a conduit for broader geopolitical and economic objectives.

Taiwan and India are poised for unprecedented investment cooperation, driven by a convergence of economic interests and geopolitical tailwinds. Recent developments illustrate this momentum: a major Taiwanese chipmaker, Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (PSMC) has partnered with India's Tata Electronics group to build the country's first 12-inch semiconductor fab, prompted in part by encouragement from Taiwan's president. Influential voices in Taiwan have even proposed negotiating a free trade agreement with India to capitalize on Prime Minister Narendra Modi's investor-friendly policies. At the same time, the two governments are laying groundwork for closer ties – for example, pursuing a labor cooperation memorandum to facilitate talent exchange. Even symbolic gestures point to warming relations; India's prime minister offered public condolences to Taiwan after a natural disaster – his first such public outreach. As vibrant democracies with shared values, both Taiwan and India recognize that deeper partnership not only promises economic gains but also enhances mutual trust and strategic alignment. The current geopolitical landscape – marked by shifting supply chains and a desire for resilient, value-based alliances – makes now the ideal time for an intensified Taiwan-India engagement.

In Taiwan's case, there was little room for operating a hedging strategy up until the 1980s, as before then the Kuomintang 國民黨 (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) administration had a military alliance with Washington against Beijing. At that time, the People's Republic of China (PRC) had not yet evolved into a potential competitor to the United States and therefore uncertainty arising from US-China rivalry had not yet emerged. Additionally, the KMT government was still rather hostile toward the PRC and did not yet covet China's economic opportunities.

As US-China relations deteriorated during the Donald Trump administration, Taiwan was left more room to enhance its soft-balancing strategy. The 2019 Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act, by force of which Washington endeavors to help Taiwan secure diplomatic relations with the United States' existing allies, as well as to prevent any form of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the stability of the social or economic systems of the people of Taiwan, became a US domestic law in 2020. Taiwan has also increased its informal military cooperation with the United States, for instance by carrying out joint military exercises and engaging in arms sales.

This article explores the evolving perceptions of Asian identity among Taiwanese university students, focusing on the impact of Taiwan's New Southbound Policy (NSP). The study uses data from the Asian Student Survey (ASS) to analyze how these students perceive neighboring Asian countries, particularly those targeted by the NSP. The findings reveal that Taiwanese students view Asia as a dynamic and diverse region but tend to prefer Western countries or developed Asian nations like Japan for education and career opportunities. The research also shows that while the NSP has enhanced Taiwan's image in some Southeast Asian countries, it has had a limited impact on altering Taiwanese students' perceptions of these nations. The study highlights the strategic significance of the NSP in fostering regional integration and mutual understanding, emphasizing the importance of people-centered exchanges in shaping regional identities. Despite the policy's achievements, the article suggests that further efforts are needed to connect Taiwanese society more deeply with the broader Asian region to fully realize the potential of regional cooperation and identity formation.

This study examines the political dynamics that shape legislators' policy positions on importing US meat into Taiwan during the past decade, focusing on the cases of US beef in 2012 and US pork in 2021. The trade policy surrounding this issue has become politically contentious, involving conflicting national interests and constituency preferences. Legislators face a dilemma, torn between prioritizing the interests of their constituents and aligning with their party's interests. The central argument posits that legislators affiliated with the ruling party are more inclined to advocate for or adjust their stances to support the removal of import bans on American meat, while those associated with the opposition party tend to exhibit a greater reluctance to endorse such a stance. Factors such as the legislators' constituent's interests, district vs party-list affiliations, the urban–rural divide, or education level do not consistently explain legislators' positions on the US meat trade policy. To examine these arguments, this study employs a mixed-method approach, incorporating quantitative analysis and two case studies of individual legislators. The findings of this study offer empirical support for the central proposition.

This article examines the connection between trade policy, alliance strategy, and public preferences. It argues that when a contentious trade agreement is perceived as a credible signal for aligning with a powerful adversary (bandwagoning), it is likely to provoke domestic opposition due to its negative impact on state survival. Conversely, when a contentious trade agreement is seen as a credible signal for counterbalancing an adversary with a non-threatening great power (balancing), it is likely to face less domestic resistance as it enhances state survival. Using a comparative case study design, this article compares two cases in Taiwan: the movement against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in 2014 and the backlash against lifting the import ban on US pork containing ractopamine in 2021. In the CSSTA case, the government's desired trade partner, China, was not sufficiently supported domestically due to public fears of negative security externalities. In the US pork case, the government sent a cue to the public that a trade deal with the US was a credible commitment required to strengthen the bilateral strategic relationship. This message was echoed by people who recognized the positive security externality and the preservation of Taiwan's sovereignty and political institutions.

By analysing three case studies—Singapore, Cambodia and Myanmar—this article investigates health security partnerships formed by Southeast Asian countries during the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on their responses to China and India's vaccine diplomacy. It argues that a combination of factors—the capability of national governments in responding to the pandemic and the cost of doing so, as well as the credibility of vaccines and geopolitical relationships with potential partners—led to a divergence in partnerships. Singapore did not rely on Chinese vaccine donations but its acceptance of assistance from China was a diplomatic move to maintain a balanced policy amidst the United States-China strategic rivalry. In contrast, Cambodia and Myanmar were obliged to partner with either China or India due to their limited capacity to manage the crisis as well as their lack of financial resources and access to top-tier vaccines. Geopolitics also played a role. China became a leading partner for Cambodia due to the strong strategic relationship they had formed before the pandemic, while the governments of Myanmar—before and after the military coup in February 2021—based their partnerships on varying political and geopolitical considerations.

This article adopted a repeated stag hunt game-theoretic model to explain the evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). It shows that the degree of state cooperation with the SCO relates positively to the expected benefits of legitimate suppression of domestic unrest, to the material and reputational costs of enforcing anti-human rights norms, to the continuation of the three evils and to the tolerance for other members' occasional betrayal. The SCO thus faces a dilemma. On the one hand, to sustain cooperation, it supports authoritarian leaders' suppression of political dissidents. On the other hand, the SCO's norms hostile towards human rights violate established international standards, thereby increasing the potential costs of mutual support. China's global hunt for Uyghurs, the extension of membership, and Russia's aggression in the region raise potential costs and harm the mutual trust within the SCO. These factors may gradually undermine leaders' willingness to support the SCO.

Although the rise of an economically powerful China benefits many developing countries, many worry about China's surging regional and global influences, especially in Southeast Asia. It is true that China has risen fast, but how successfully it has translated its rising power into actual political influence remains a question. In this study I answer this question by examining a crucial case of the Sino-Myanmar relationship. Because Myanmar relies heavily on China, it is one of the most likely countries to be heavily influenced by China. If, however, Myanmar has been less cooperative under such an imbalanced relationship, then China's actual influence may be exaggerated. I use the Composite Index of Economic Influence (CIEI) to show which country Myanmar depends on the most in terms of economic interdependence. The CIEI indicates that Myanmar relies on China the most and cannot be easily replaced in the short term . Given such a high interdependent relationship, however, evidence shows that since Myanmar started political reform in 2011, its behavior has begun to deviate from China's positions on the issues of human rights and a nuclear-free world . Furthermore China's influence has not been well received by the local communities who view Chinese-supported projects as exploitative economic adventurism. This study explores the causes of this opposition in an analysis of China's investments in the Myitsone Dam and Letpadaung copper mine projects. Results suggest that China's soft footprints do not appear as strong and welcome as perceived. The power from interdependent relationship requires political and social cohesion to take hold.

In recent years, China's repressive and authoritarian behavior, both internally and externally, has elicited concern in Europe. As a result, many European countries have started to reconsider their approach towards China and acknowledge the necessity of strategically containing its ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. The Czech Republic is one such country that has formulated an official Indo-Pacific Strategy to signal its strategic interests in the region. Prague has identified geopolitics, regional economics, and the established international order as areas of strategic importance, and has outlined its objectives for addressing these issues. In particular, Taiwan has been recognized as a critical partner for cooperation. As the strategic interests of Europe and China continue to diverge, and China's perception in Europe deteriorates, Taiwan's standing in the Czech Republic and Europe has been on the rise, thereby facilitating Taiwan's diplomatic efforts on the continent.

Economic and trade relations between Taiwan and Australia have fluctuated over the past three decades mainly because the traded goods chiefly comprise primary products, which are subject to the fluctuating global prices of raw materials. Despite the steady increase in the volume of traded goods, the overall value of bilateral trade has had ups and downs. Moreover, due to Australia's high trade interdependence with China, China has often been able to obstruct Australian efforts to develop its economic and trade relations with Taiwan.

As the global shortage of Western vaccines persisted during the COVID-19 crisis, many severely affected countries become more susceptible to China's vaccine diplomacy, which involves trading vaccines for political concessions. The main focus of this article is to identify the factors that make China's vaccine diplomacy more effective. Using a mixed method, this study finds that political factors matter more than the severity of the health crisis. Countries are more likely to welcome China's vaccines if they enjoy higher geopolitical affinity with China, receive more Belt and Road Initiative investments, have no diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and are more authoritarian. No strong evidence can be found that the factor of crisis level is significant. This study also finds that China's donations of vaccines are less politically discriminatory than its sales. They can be used to bring countries closer into China's political orbit during the crisis.

Southeast Asia consists primarily of eleven countries, and geographic constraints have made connectivity among them difficult, thereby impeding regional development. In recent years, Southeast Asia has become an important area of regional economic growth. Under rapid economic expansion, Southeast Asian countries have actively sought infrastructure development, while neighboring and extra-regional countries, seeing the growing demand for infrastructure investment, have also participated actively in infrastructure projects in the region. Participating countries hope not only that infrastructure will generate economic and commercial benefits, but also that these projects will enhance Southeast Asia?s international political influence. As a result, strategic and political considerations often accompany infrastructure development, shaping the success or failure of these projects together with economic interests.

Enze Han, in his book Asymmetrical Neighbors, extends his explanatory framework about the dynamics of state and nation-building beyond domestic factors to examine borderland state building between China and its neighboring Southeast Asian countries. The book argues that the relationship and power distribution between China and each of its neighburs are ripe for theoretical consideration. Accordingly, Han develops a theoretical framework called the “neighborhood effect” in Chapter 2. The framework is intuitive and specific. Two of the four types of situations that fit Han's theory are most relevant to the book's main focus, which is ethnic politics along the borders between China and Southeast Asia. The first type contends that if two adjacent countries encounter an asymmetrical power structure and an adversarial relationship, the more powerful country will exert political/military meddling, resulting in fragmentation of the weaker state's control of its borderland. The second considers that if the power structure is unbalanced while the bilateral relationship is amicable, the effects will mostly be felt in extensive economic influences emanating from the more powerful country.

Studying the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) through the lens of international relations (IR) theory, Chen argues that it is inappropriate to treat the AIIB as either a revisionist or a complementary institution. Instead, the bank is still evolving and the interaction of power, interests, and status that will determine whether the bank will go wild. Theoretically, the current shape of the AIIB will influence global strategic conditions and global perceptions of the bank itself, consequently affecting China's level of dissatisfaction with its power and status in the international financial system and maneuvering in the AIIB. To empirically show that, this book presents the evolution of the AIIB, compares the bank with its main competitors in the Asia-Pacific region, and conducts ten comparative case studies to show how countries around the world have positioned themselves in response to the emergence of the AIIB. This book presents critical insights for scholars and foreign-policy practitioners to understand China's surging influence in international organizations and how China can shape the world order. It should prove of interest to students and scholars of IR, strategic studies, China Studies, Asian Studies, developmental studies, economics, and global finance.

After the fierce and contentious 2020 U.S. presidential election, Joe Biden won for the presidency. One pressing question is whether the Biden administration will reverse Trump's economic policies toward China. Given the challenge of power structure change from China, the new American government may be left without many alternatives but to continue Trump's policies in general. But the approach is likely to be a more multilateral approach, and be responsive to the interests of allies and domestic corporate interests. In protecting its economic security, Taiwan should diversify is global economic partnership and reduce its dependence on China. Further, Taiwan should upgrade its domestic infrastructure and design effective policy incentives for global investors to invest in Taiwan, making Taiwan a high-end technology hub. Lastly, Taiwan should seek the active participation in the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative, cooperating with U.S. and its allies in restructuring global supply chains.

Although economic cooperation remains one of its central concerns, the New Southbound Policy?s people-centered orientation seeks to extend the policy agenda to talent exchange, resource sharing, and regional connectivity. It hopes that Taiwan and New Southbound countries will be connected not only by economic interests, but also through deeper social and interpersonal engagement. Under the strong promotion of the Tsai administration, the New Southbound Policy is no longer only a matter for Taiwanese businesses or scholars; Taiwanese society has gradually encountered more elements from Southeast Asia and South Asia. Overall, however, our understanding of these countries and societies remains limited, and discrimination caused by misunderstanding is still often seen or heard. This region is transforming in unprecedented ways and at unprecedented speed, and in order to connect effectively with these societies and deepen mutual understanding, Taiwanese society must continually update its knowledge of New Southbound countries.

This paper seeks to explore whether the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has become an instrument of power led by China to fulfill her geopolitical interests. After an investigation of the AIIB's power structure, institutional design, and its 34 approved projects, this study finds that although the AIIB deviates to some extent from international standards while considering loan decisions, the bank itself does not appear to be a norm challenger so far. Instead, it has become more cooperative and inclusive, with a shifting focus towards mutually beneficial cooperation and reform of the international financial system. This paper argues that the AIIB's current configuration results from the decrease in China's status deficit—the gap between China's recognized international financial status and its own perception of its financial power. Quantitative and qualitative evidence shows that when the idea of the AIIB was first conceived, China's status deficit was large, which meant that in a global power struggle the AIIB was more likely to be manipulated by a dissatisfied China. As the AIIB evolved, China's international financial status gained positive recognition and the AIIB received wider acceptance; China's status deficit shrank. As a result, the AIIB has become a reform-minded multilateral financial institution that has made concessions to establish rules and has sought collaboration with its counterparts.

Although the rise of an economically powerful China benefits many developing countries, many worry about China's surging regional and global influences, especially in Southeast Asia. It is true that China has risen fast, but how successfully it has translated its rising power into actual political influence remains a question. In this study I answer this question by examining a crucial case of the Sino-Myanmar relationship. Because Myanmar relies heavily on China, it is one of the most likely countries to be heavily influenced by China. If, however, Myanmar has been less cooperative under such an imbalanced relationship, then China's actual influence may be exaggerated. I use the Composite Index of Economic Influence (CIEI) to show which country Myanmar depends on the most in terms of economic interdependence. The CIEI indicates that Myanmar relies on China the most and cannot be easily replaced in the short term . Given such a high interdependent relationship, however, evidence shows that since Myanmar started political reform in 2011, its behavior has begun to deviate from China's positions on the issues of human rights and a nuclear-free world . Furthermore China's influence has not been well received by the local communities who view Chinese-supported projects as exploitative economic adventurism. This study explores the causes of this opposition in an analysis of China's investments in the Myitsone Dam and Letpadaung copper mine projects. Results suggest that China's soft footprints do not appear as strong and welcome as perceived. The power from interdependent relationship requires political and social cohesion to take hold.

Brady considers that China has a strong interest in the opportunities offered by the North and South poles, in terms of traditional and non-traditional security, natural and economic resources, and science and technology. In the area of security, maintaining freedom of transportation in the Arctic region can provide China with an alternative to the more expensive, dangerous, and volatile sea lanes through the Malacca Strait, the Panama Canal, or along the Somalian coast, as well as better access for its submarines. By using the maritime routes through the Arctic, Chinese naval vessels can circumvent any military blockade imposed by the United States and its Pacific allies. Although Antarctica is less important to China than the Arctic, it also has military-strategic significance in that it is on the air route linking Oceania, South America, and Africa. Now that the US Air Force has a base in Antarctica, Brady expects China to expand its role in the region by deploying more military personnel for logistics purpose.

This paper asks why half of the members of the European Union (EU) have chosen to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in defiance of substantial pressure from Washington. If the AIIB is too good an economic opportunity for Europe to ignore, then why did the rest of the EU turn its back on this organization? To account for this apparent variation in the attitude of European countries, I argue that, ceteris paribus, changes in the strategic situation involving Europe, the USA, and China, as well as differing expectations of economic opportunities in a developing Asia, have led European countries in different directions. Those countries which are getting increasingly friendly with China, which results from increasing level of alliance security dilemma with the USA, and are highly dependent on the potentially gigantic Asian market are the most likely to follow China's lead. Countries that are not so geared toward China or Asia are least likely to join the AIIB. Where only one of these factors is present, the country will remain hesitant. I test this argument using both quantitative and qualitative analysis. This includes probit analysis for 31 countries and three in-depth case studies involving Germany, Belgium, and Romania. These countries have a high, median, and low chance of joining the bank, respectively. The findings of both types of analysis support the proposed analytical framework.

For scholars of international relations, “theory” is regarded as an important intellectual tool for explaining history, analyzing current conditions, and predicting the future. Current scholarship offers many different interpretations of the relationship between Southeast Asian countries and China, yet there is little comprehensive explanation that examines the relationship between theoretical tools and empirical facts. In light of this, this article takes different research traditions in international relations theory as its foundation and seeks to present possible regional scenarios constituted by relations between China and Southeast Asia. On this basis, it further analyzes possible actions and strategies of the actors involved in shaping peace and stable development in Southeast Asia and East Asia. After reviewing various theories, this article argues that there are at least five conditions for regional stability: first, the United States needs to strengthen its commitment to strategic deployment in Southeast Asia; second, China needs to slow the development and application of offensive weapons; third, economic, trade, and investment relations between Southeast Asia and China need to improve and move toward mutual benefit; fourth, countries in the region need to accelerate democratic political development; and fifth, ASEAN regional organizations must become more effective regional organizations capable of coordinating differences. Otherwise, the region will find it difficult to move toward peace and stability.

This paper investigates the underlying China factor that played out when nine countries ended diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (hereafter called 'Taiwan'). Research shows acquiring economic benefits from China, in terms of trade, investment and foreign aid, securing China's support for enhancing international status and consolidating domestic political power are important factors when an ally of Taiwan considers breaking ties. Most allies receive immediate and significant political and economic benefits from China, even those who have been allies of Taiwan for many years, as soon as they severe ties. They can greatly improve their national interests by capitalizing on the Taiwan-China diplomatic battle. Thus, Taiwan cannot win this fight by appealing to morals and ideals. Diplomatic allies are not for sale; Taiwan is only able to rent them for a while. If maintaining the number of diplomatic allies remains a priority for Taiwan, the government needs to come up with more comprehensive, flexible and customized economic incentives in order to(re-)establish diplomatic relationships with target countries.

This chapter asks that given Taiwan's current socioeconomic situation and electoral system, will the newly emerged New Power Party (NPP) become one of the main political parties in Taiwan in the upcoming future? We answer the question by identifying electoral, ideological, supportive, and organizational factors. The findings show that, first, the current electoral system seems unfavorable for a small party like NPP who rely on more radical stances; second, the NPP's ideological positions may be adverse to increase its voters' base; third, the NPP's ambition of becoming a left-wing political party does not seem to correspond well with current supporters; and fourth, the party's centralized, top-down communicative manner can be detrimental to its popularity among the new internet generation.

From the perspective of the state as the unit of analysis, each country has its own external balance of payments. A country can earn revenue from others by producing internationally competitive goods and exporting them in large quantities; after obtaining such revenue, it can invest funds overseas and lend to countries that need capital for cross-border economic transactions. In this process, some countries become debtor states because of trade deficits, such as the United States, while others become creditor states by accumulating large trade surpluses, such as China. If the gap between deficits and surpluses widens, international payments will become imbalanced. Some countries can rapidly accumulate wealth while others experience outflows, creating difficulties in national financial structures and affecting the foundations of international power. To correct these imbalances, states will seek to reverse the situation through negotiations or policy measures, but disputes and misunderstandings often arise in the process, and further deterioration may affect the international security environment.

This paper asks whether Donald Trump is likely to act tough on China as he signaled during his campaign for the U.S. presidency. According to evidence presented in this paper, I argue that the Trump administration has adopted a more moderate approach after assuming power for two reasons. First, Trump did not base his past harsh rhetoric on facts; therefore, there is no foundation to support a containment strategy against China. Second, antagonizing China in economic affairs may create unintended consequences for the U.S., which may harm the U.S. domestic economy and his odds of winning a second term. In the South China Sea, however, Trump will continue with a tougher stance, but refrain from further escalation because backing down on security issues will signify his cowardice, which will generate domestic audience costs. As a result, the likelihood of starting a trade war, currency war, or military showdown in East Asia under Trump is low.

This paper finds that China has developed deep interdependent relationships in Asia through trade, investment and aid over the past decade. Many Asian countries depend heavily on the wealth generated in China since the Reform and Opening Up period. China is now actively promoting the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI) to improve Asia's infrastructure development, business environment and connectivity. This also makes the Asian market more accessible to China, helping to sustain China's rapid economic development. However, to downplay outsider's concern for China's emergence in Asia, China has to take heed of its over-exploitive business model, as well as maintaining an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank that is compliant with the existing order. Otherwise, Chinese engagement in Asia might confront local, or even a region-wide, backlash.

This paper assesses whether the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank（AIIB）signals China's reformist intention in the area of international development. I use both descriptive and inferential statistics to compare power distribution in the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank（ADB）, and the AIIB, and the composition of the AIIB membership. Evidence shows that there is no obvious structural difference in voting power among the three banks. The major difference between them is that China is the most powerful state in the AIIB. For the time being, at least, the AIIB does not signal Beijing's intention to reform the current system. Instead, the bank seems to be an instrument for China to compete with established international financial institutions. However, Beijing may be faced with several challenges. First, dissatisfied members of the World Bank will not find a remedy for the organization's shortcomings in the AIIB. The problem of unequal representation structure remains. Second, the AIIB is unlikely to facilitate formation of a China-led alliance, nor is it likely to adopt global best practice due to disparity of interests among its members. Third, Washington and Tokyo are probably right to refuse to join the AIIB and to devote more attention to strengthening the World Bank and the ADB instead. Greater competition among the three is likely to reduce the AIIB's influence. To sum up, it is difficult to detect any reformist intention behind the AIIB, and it is still too weak an organization to facilitate formation of a strong alliance by means of which China can carry out its international agenda.

Track II diplomacy is of specific strategic interest for Taiwan under the barriers of participation in international organizations and the formation of diplomatic ties with major powers. The Taipei-Seoul Forum/ Seoul-Taipei Forum (TSF/STF), which was inaugurated in the early 1990s worked as an important example of how track II diplomacy can contribute 10 Taiwan's relations with South Korea based upon interpersonal relationships and links between think tanks on either side. This paper examines the development of TSF/STF to examine the opportunities for and constraints all track JJ diplomacy efforts to nurture bilateral relations between Taiwan and South Korea. Through the lens of social capital as an analytical framework, this paper portrays the unique process of interpersonal social networking that takes place through TSF/STF, which has managed to preserve a fragile bilateral relationship during a period of extreme difficulty.

The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) hoped to realize the goal of an ASEAN single market by 2015, but external evaluations of this goal have differed. Some believe that the AEC can make ASEAN one of the world's leading production bases and markets and substantially raise the region's economic level, while others argue that ASEAN's mechanisms are weak, member states' identification with ASEAN is low, resources needed for integration are insufficient, intra-regional differences are too large, and major powers are all eyeing ASEAN's potential strength, making integration difficult to advance. This article evaluates the AEC's current status and future challenges by examining its stated goals of economic growth momentum and justice in the distribution of benefits. If the AEC can demonstrate achievements in these areas, it can enhance the legitimacy of continued promotion and increase member states' identification with and implementation of the AEC; otherwise, integration will face many difficulties. In other words, these factors will be key to whether the AEC's economic integration can succeed. On this basis, this article finds that the AEC has brought positive effects in promoting trade among countries and attracting foreign investment, but its added effect on overall economic growth momentum is less evident. The AEC has merely maintained the original economic growth momentum of ASEAN member states and has not further elevated it to another level; therefore, it may be difficult for it to continue obtaining sufficient legitimacy in promoting regional economic growth. In addition, the AEC has not promoted the goal of reducing the wealth gap, or its effectiveness is not evident. Although the implementation of the AEC has brought slight improvements in distributive justice and narrowing development gaps, the concentration of wealth remains extremely large.

Connections among countries around the world are becoming increasingly close, and barriers to exchange are decreasing. Although this trend has promoted global development, the blurring of national borders has also brought new challenges. Taiwan, which is deeply dependent on the international community, must be prepared to face these challenges, including global warming, energy crises, the impact of free trade, technological progress, population aging, declining birth rates, and increasing international migration. Yunlin, Taiwan, is significantly affected by these trends. This article examines the impact of these trends on Yunlin from Yunlin?s perspective, reviews the current state of development in various areas, and finally proposes how Yunlin can use its advantages to find opportunities amid these challenges and create a green, sustainable, and livable Yunlin.

This paper proposes that if a political system is more like to facilitate a unified government, to establish a strong executive body and to respond to the needs of the majority, financial reforms are more likely to emerge from the policymaking process and produce positive results. On the contrary, political systems that discourage those governing features are less likely to produce reforms. This chapter compares financial reform processes in China, Taiwan and New Zealand. All of them performed low level of financial reforms in the early 1980s but resulted in different situations later. In the mid-2000s, New Zealand heralded the most efficient and stable financial system; while Taiwan lagged behind and China performed the worst. Evidence showed that China's authoritarian system may be the most superior in forming a unified government with a strong executive, but the policy priority often responds more to the interests of a small group of power elites; therefore the result of financial reform can be limited. Taiwan's presidential system can produce greater financial reform when the ruling party controls both executive and legislative bodies, but legislative obstructions may occur under a divided government. New Zealand's Westminster system produces the most effective and efficient financial reform due to its unified government and a strong executive branch with consistent and stable supports from the New Zealand Parliament.

Global economic imbalance leads to change in the global distribution of economic resources. While some foresee the inevitable decline of US power, others consider China's forthcoming global primacy to be an exaggeration. This paper seeks to contribute to the debate by linking balance of payments (BOP) to power analysis. Dimensions of BOP are connected to Keohane and Nye's two ideal-types of interdependence relationship: realist and complex interdependence. The former relates to the global distribution of aggregate economic resources; the latter emphasizes a detailed investigation of distinct interdependence situations between countries. China's BOP from 1997 to 2012 is assessed through the lens of both ideal-type scenarios. The findings show that China's growing power manifests principally in its rising status as a major global buyer in primary goods and its growing military strength in the region. However, China is confronted with possible slowdown in wealth accumulation and its lagging technological development. At present, the speculation of China's upcoming global primacy may be exaggerated, but its dominant position in the region is indeed on the rise.

In the face of a rising China, some scholars have argued that ASEAN countries will choose to either bandwagon with or balance against China, while others believe they will respond with a more moderate policy known as 'hedging'. In considering these options, ASEAN countries must take into account their individual interests within the economic and security structure of this region. In this research, we argue that each ASEAN country confronts divergent sets of security and economic relations with China, which play a major role in shaping their policy responses. We can characterize their responses into four quadrants. Each cell can be categorized in terms of a high or low degree of threat perception (HT or LT) from China, as well as a positive or negative economic expectation (PE or NE) with China. We thus hypothesize that ASEAN countries in the HT–NE situation will balance against China; those in the LT–PE situation will bandwagon with China; those in the HT–PE or LT–NE situations will hedge against China. Hypotheses are supported by three case studies, Vietnam–China (HT–NE), Cambodia–China (LT–PE) and Singapore–China (HT–PE) relations.

Whether a positive relationship exists between foreign aid and economic development is debatable. Supporters of foreign aid argue that aid money can translate into economic growth, while skeptics suggest that aid cannot lead to prosperity due to poor management of aid funds. In this paper, we examine the effect of foreign aid by investigating 26 developing countries of Asian Development Bank. The quantitative evidences suggest that direct link between foreign aid and economic development is weak. However, aid receiving countries in Asia are more likely to realize better economic growth if they are less corruptive and with higher education quality, which increase the likelihood of using the aid money in a wiser way. In addition, trade liberalization, considered as a critical engine for domestic economic growth seems to dampen the economic development in development countries.

Attracting allies through cultural exchange and economic interdependence, what Nye refers to as soft power, is becoming increasingly important for states around the world. This thinking is increasingly influencing not only East Asian governments, but also their citizens. Based on the importance of economy and trade, states use soft power to attract others, making them alter their policies. For example, Taiwan has used economic incentives to secure votes from third world countries in support of its application to several international organizations despite Chinese opposition. In East Asia, the ideological and military power that dominated strategic thinking in cold war era no long satisfies the state's needs. The shift of thinking is reflected in two recent presidential elections in East Asia. Taiwan and South Korea both advanced democratic development in the past three decades. Parties that symbolize progress together overwhelmed conservative parties in the last four presidential elections held by either South Korea or Taiwan.

After experiencing two devastating world wars during the first half of the twentieth century, world leaders became determined to establish a mechanism that could prevent such conflicts from occurring again. It was under these circumstances that the United Nations was created. The founders of the United Nations placed great hopes in this new international organization, expecting it to safeguard fundamental human rights, foster an international society founded upon justice and the rule of law, and, as emphasized in the UN Charter, “promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.”

However, after more than six decades of development, the United Nations still has a considerable distance to travel before realizing these original aspirations. Along this challenging journey, not only does the organization require the voluntary support and assistance of the international community, but it also faces an urgent need for institutional and operational reforms to enhance its effectiveness in addressing contemporary global challenges.