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Trading for Survival: Trade Policy as a Credible Signal, Alliance Strategy, and Public Preferences in Taiwan

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中文摘要

本文探討貿易政策、聯盟戰略與民眾偏好之間的關聯性。文章主張，當一項具有爭議性的貿易協議被視為向強大對手靠攏（bandwagoning）的可信訊號時，由於可能對國家生存與安全造成負面影響，因此較容易引發國內反對聲浪。相反地，當一項具有爭議性的貿易協議被認為是與非威脅性大國合作以制衡對手（balancing）的可信訊號時，由於有助於提升國家安全與生存能力，因此較不容易遭遇國內阻力。本文採用比較個案研究方法，分析台灣兩個重要案例：2014年反對《海峽兩岸服務貿易協議》（CSSTA）的太陽花運動，以及2021年開放含萊克多巴胺（ractopamine）美國豬肉進口所引發的社會爭議。在服貿協議案例中，由於中國被視為潛在威脅來源，民眾擔憂協議可能帶來負面的安全外部性，因此政府所推動的對中貿易合作未能獲得充分的國內支持。相較之下，在美豬進口爭議中，政府向社會傳達了一項訊息：與美國達成相關貿易安排，是深化台美戰略夥伴關係所需展現的可信承諾。此一論述獲得部分民眾認同，因為他們認為與美國深化經貿合作具有正面的安全外部性，不僅有助於強化台灣的安全保障，也有助於維護台灣的主權地位與民主政治制度。因此，儘管美豬開放政策同樣引發食品安全方面的爭議，其所面臨的政治反彈程度仍相對低於服貿協議所遭遇的強烈社會抵制。

Abstract

This article examines the connection between trade policy, alliance strategy, and public preferences. It argues that when a contentious trade agreement is perceived as a credible signal for aligning with a powerful adversary (bandwagoning), it is likely to provoke domestic opposition due to its negative impact on state survival. Conversely, when a contentious trade agreement is seen as a credible signal for counterbalancing an adversary with a non-threatening great power (balancing), it is likely to face less domestic resistance as it enhances state survival. Using a comparative case study design, this article compares two cases in Taiwan: the movement against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in 2014 and the backlash against lifting the import ban on US pork containing ractopamine in 2021. In the CSSTA case, the government's desired trade partner, China, was not sufficiently supported domestically due to public fears of negative security externalities. In the US pork case, the government sent a cue to the public that a trade deal with the US was a credible commitment required to strengthen the bilateral strategic relationship. This message was echoed by people who recognized the positive security externality and the preservation of Taiwan's sovereignty and political institutions.

引用格式

Chen, I. T.-y. (2024). Trading for Survival: Trade Policy as a Credible Signal, Alliance Strategy, and Public Preferences in Taiwan. Review of International Political Economy, 31(1), 253-276. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2023.2190922
Chen, Ian Tsung-yen. "Trading for Survival: Trade Policy as a Credible Signal, Alliance Strategy, and Public Preferences in Taiwan." Review of International Political Economy, vol. 31, no. 1, 2024, pp. 253-276, doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2023.2190922.
Chen, Ian Tsung-yen. "Trading for Survival: Trade Policy as a Credible Signal, Alliance Strategy, and Public Preferences in Taiwan." Review of International Political Economy 31, no. 1 (2024): 253-276. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2023.2190922
Chen, Ian Tsung-yen 2024, 'Trading for Survival: Trade Policy as a Credible Signal, Alliance Strategy, and Public Preferences in Taiwan', Review of International Political Economy, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 253-276, https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2023.2190922.
Chen, Ian Tsung-yen. Trading for Survival: Trade Policy as a Credible Signal, Alliance Strategy, and Public Preferences in Taiwan. Review of International Political Economy. 2024;31(1):253-276. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2023.2190922
@article{Chen2024TradingforSurvival,
  author = {Chen, Ian Tsung-yen},
  title = {Trading for Survival: Trade Policy as a Credible Signal, Alliance Strategy, and Public Preferences in Taiwan},
  year = {2024},
  journal = {Review of International Political Economy},
  volume = {31},
  number = {1},
  pages = {253-276},
  doi = {10.1080/09692290.2023.2190922},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2023.2190922}
}